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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
CAMERON THOMAS LOPES, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20000309-SC 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
This appeal is from a final order entered in connection with a judgment of 
conviction for criminal homicide, murder, a first degree felony offense in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1995), in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs, Judge, presiding. The 
order, entered on March 13,2000, is entitled, "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & 
Order, Re: Defendant's Motion to Be Afforded a Jury Trial on Criminal Homicide 
Charge." A copy of the order is attached hereto as Addendum A. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) 
(1996). 
RULES. STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following provisions will be determinative of the issue on appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) (1999). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995). 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 28 (2000). 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 30 (2000). 
The text of those provisions is contained in the attached Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue presented for review is as follows: 
Whether this Court's ruling in the original appeal in this case governs on remand 
in the trial court. In the previous appeal of this case, State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, 980 
P.2d 191 ("Lopes Y\ this Court "reverse[d]" the judgment of conviction for enhanced 
murder and"remand[ed]" the case to the trial court for a "new trial." On remand, 
Defendant Cameron Lopes requested a new trial pursuant to Lopes I. The trial court 
denied Lopes' request and entered an order modifying the judgment of conviction. Lopes 
maintains that the lower court was required to comply with this Court's order and to 
provide a new trial. A copy of the decision in Lopes I is attached hereto as Addendum C. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Inasmuch as the issue on appeal concerns application 
of Lopes I and the interpretation of statutory law and procedural rules, this Court will 
review the matter for correctness, according no deference to the trial court's 
determinations. See State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); see also State v. 
Redd, 1999 UT 108, ^10, 992 P.2d 986 (Redd ID (citing Gutierrez v. Medley, 972 P.2d 
913, 914-15 (Utah 1998)); Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 874 
2 
P.2d 840, 842 (Utah 1994) (whether the lower court properly complied on remand with 
appellate court's earlier ruling on the matter is a question of law which this Court 
reviews for correctness). 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
The issue on appeal is preserved in the trial court record ("R.") at 234-84 and 364, 
where Lopes specifically requested a trial on remand on the enhanced murder offense as 
ordered by this Court in Lopes L 1999 UT 24, ffi[l, 21-22. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. Course of Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below. 
In an Amended Information dated March 1996, the state charged Lopes with 
criminal homicide, murder, a first degree felony offense in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-203, and provided notice that it was seeking imposition of gang and gun enhance-
ments. (R. 12-17.) Lopes moved for the entry of an order striking imposition of the gang 
enhancement set forth at Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1, on the basis that the statute 
violated his constitutional rights. The trial court denied the motion. (R. 38-79; 88-91.) 
Thereafter, Lopes entered a conditional guilty plea to the enhanced murder charge, 
pursuant to State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988V (R. 103-09; 363:14-19.) The 
parties specifically conditioned the plea on Lopes1 right to appeal the constitutionality of 
§ 76-3-203.1. (R. 363:10, 14, 18-19); Lopes L 1999 UT 24,1(3 n. 2. On October 7, 
1996, the trial court sentenced Lopes to an indeterminate term of five years to life for 
3 
murder, and imposed gun and gang enhancements. (R. 112; 113-17.) 
Lopes appealed from the judgment, and on March 16, 1999, this Court ruled that 
the gang enhancement statute at Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 deprived Lopes "of 
certain fundamental constitutional rights." Lopes L 1999 UT 24, «J1. This Court 
"reverse[d]" the conviction in the matter "and remand[ed]" the case "for a new trial on 
the section 76-3-203.1 charge." Idatffl[21-22. 
On remand, Lopes requested a trial on the enhanced murder charge. (R. 234-84.) 
The trial court denied Lopes' request. (R. 343-45.) Lopes contends that the trial court 
erred in its ruling. He appeals from the final order entered in connection with the 
sentence and judgment of conviction for murder. (R. 350.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In March 1996, the state charged Lopes by Amended Information with murder, a 
first degree felony offense, and provided notice that it was seeking imposition of gang 
and gun enhancements. (R. 12-17.) According to the Amended Informzition, at 6:00 a.m. 
on February 22, 1996, two rounds were fired into an open window at Joey Miera, hitting 
him in the head. Miera died as a result of the gunshot wounds. (R. 12-15.) 
In the trial court, Lopes filed a motion to declare Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1, 
the gang enhancement statute, unconstitutional on the basis that imposition of an 
4 
enhanced sentence as set forth in the statute deprived him of a right to a jury trial, among 
other things. (R. 38-79.) The trial court denied the motion. (R. 88-91.) Thus, pursuant 
to an agreement with the state, and in accordance with Sery, 758 P.2d at 935, Lopes 
entered a conditional plea of guilty on the enhanced homicide offense. (R. 103-09; 
363:10, 14, 16-19 (Judge Peuler acknowledged Sery plea and that the "guilty plea" in the 
matter would not affect his right to appeal).) Thereafter, the judge sentenced Lopes on 
the matter, and ordered him to serve an enhanced penalty for murder. (R. 112-17.) 
Lopes appealed from the judgment. (R. 127-28.) 
On March 16, 1999, this Court issued its opinion in the case on appeal and ruled 
that Section 76-3-203.1 in relevant part was unconstitutional. The Court reversed and 
remanded the matter, and ordered a "new trial on the section 76-3-203.1 charge." Lopes 
I, 1999 UT 24,^22. 
On remand in the trial court, Lopes requested a new trial. (R. 234-84.) The state 
opposed the request on the basis that it had determined to withdraw or dismiss the gang 
enhancement penalty against Lopes, among other things. Thus, according to the state, 
Lopes would not be entitled to a new trial. (R. 364:7-8; 344.) The trial court ruled in 
favor of the state and denied Lopes' request. (R. 343-45.) Lopes has appealed from the 
trial court's ruling relating to the judgment. He respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse and remand the case for a new trial pursuant to Lopes I. Additional facts relevant 
to the issue on appeal are set forth below. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In an initial appeal to this Court, Lopes prevailed on his claim that Utah's gang 
enhancement statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995), violated his constitutional 
rights. Lopes I, 1999 UT 24. Because of the constitutional violation, this Court reversed 
and remanded the case for a new trial on the enhanced charge. Id.at ^ 1, 21-22. 
On remand in the trial court, Lopes requested the new trial as ordered by this 
Court. The trial court denied the request and ordered that Lopes' sentence would be 
modified to reflect dismissal of the gang enhancement. Lopes has appealed the trial 
court's ruling on the matter. He maintains that this Court's order in Lopes I governs. 
The trial court must hold a new trial. 
In addition, pursuant to Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 28, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure 30, Utah statutory law and case law, the trial court was required to 
comply with the letter and the spirit of Lopes L and provide a new trial on the enhanced 
murder charge. Lopes requests that this Court enter an order to enforce its ruling in 
Lopes L 1999 UT 24, Tffl 1, 21-22. 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT'S ORDER IN LOPES I TO REMAND THE CASE FOR A 
NEW TRIAL ON THE "SECTION 76-3-203.1 CHARGE" GOVERNS, 
A. LOPES PREVAILED ON APPEAL IN LOPES L 
6 
This case was previously before this Court in Lopes I. There, the above-named 
defendant, Cameron Lopes, asked this Court to find that Section 76-3-203.1 violated 
certain constitutional rights. Lopes L 1999 UT 24, [^1. Specifically, the statute allowed a 
sentencing court to increase punishment for an underlying offense based on proof to the 
court that defendant committed the offense "in concert" with two or more persons. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995). The statute in relevant part stated the following: 
(l)(a) A person who commits any offense listed in Subsection (4) in concert with 
two or more persons is subject to an enhanced penalty for the offense as provided 
below. 
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used in this section means the 
defendant and two or more other persons would be criminally liable for the 
offense as parties under Section 76-2-202. 
Lopes L 1999 UT 24,1J8 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.l(l)(a) & (b) (1995) 
(emphasis in opinion)). The statute also specified that "the sentencing judge rather than 
the jury shall decide whether to impose the enhanced penalty under this section." Lopes 
I, 1999 UT 24, H17 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.l(5)(c) (1995)). 
In his original appeal in the case, Lopes argued that the statute created a specific, 
new crime of a higher degree. See. id. at fflfl 1-15. That is, the legislature provided for 
imposition of an enhancement upon proof of elements over and above those required for 
a crime of lesser consequence. Inasmuch as the additional elements served to transform 
the underlying offense into a greater, enhanced offense, Lopes was entitled to have the 
state prove the additional elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.at f 5. Also, Section 
76-3-203. l(5)(c) - which specified that the "sentencing judge rather than the jury shall 
7 
decide whether to impose the enhanced penalty" - interfered with Lopes's right under 
the Utah Constitution to a jury trial on the additional elements. Id.at ]^16. 
This Court agreed and declared subsection (5)(c) of the statute unconstitutional. 
Id. In addition, this Court recognized that a defendant has the right to have a jury 
determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether the state has established the elements of 
the greater, enhanced offense. Id. at [^17. This Court severed the offensive subsection 
(5)(c) from § 76-3-203.1 and declared 'the remaining portion of the gang enhancement 
statute constitutional." Id. at ]f20. 
After determining that Lopes prevailed on appeal, this Court addressed "the pro-
per course of further proceedings in this case," id. at ^21, and ruled that the case would 
be remanded for a new trial on the charge of enhanced murder. Id. On remand in the 
trial court, Lopes requested a new trial in accordance with Lopes L 1999 UT 24, ^[21-22. 
(R. 234-84.) Judge Fuchs denied the request and entered an order modifying the 
judgment against Lopes to vacate the gang enhancement. (R. 343-45.) As further set 
forth below, the trial court was required to comply with this Court's order. The trial 
court erred in failing to provide the new trial. 
B. UNDER CASE LAW AND THE RULES. THE TRIAL COURT WAS 
REQUIRED TO COMPLY WITH THE LETTER AND THE SPIRIT OF THIS 
COURT'S ORDER IN LOPESL 
1. The Rules Mandate that the Trial Court Comply with this Court's Order on 
Remand. 
This Court has the power and authority to dispose of a matter on appeal as it 
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deems appropriate. See State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1209-1211 (Utah 1993); see also 
State v. Powasnik. 918 P.2d 146, 150 n. 2 (Utah App. 1996). To that end, the rules of 
appellate procedure provide the following: 
If a judgment of conviction is reversed, a new trial shall be held unless otherwise 
specified by the court. If a judgment of conviction or other order is affirmed or 
modified, the judgment or order affirmed or modified shall be executed. 
Utah R. App. P. 30(b) (2000). 
Rule 28(a) of the rules of criminal procedure likewise provides that "[if] a judg-
ment of conviction is reversed, a new trial shall be held unless otherwise specified by the 
appellate court.9' Utah R. Crim. P. 28(a) (2000). This Court has interpreted the rules to 
provide this Court with authority on appeal to unilaterally modify, amend, alter, or vacate 
a judgment of conviction on appeal. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1209-11. That is, this Court 
may enter an order to modify a judgment even if the parties on appeal have not requested 
such relief. "[We] have the authority to modify criminal judgments on appeal. And like 
other [appellate] courts having this power, we may enter judgment on a lesser included 
offense when an error has tainted the conviction for the greater offense." Id. at 1211. 
Rules 28(a) and 30(b), above, likewise govern a trial court's conduct on remand. 
Significantly, those rules do not allow the trial court to unilaterally modify, alter, vacate, 
or amend a judgment. Rather, the rules mandate that if an appellate court rules that a 
judgment of conviction "is reversed, a new trial shall be held unless otherwise specified 
by the appellate court." Utah R. Crim. P. 28(a) (2000); Utah R. App. P. 30(b) (2000). 
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Conversely, "[if] a judgment of conviction or other order is affirmed or modified, the 
judgment or order affirmed or modified shall be executed." Utah R. App. 30(b) (2000); 
Utah R. Crim. P. 28(b) (2000). 
In the original appeal in this case, this Court three times specified that "we, 
therefore, reverse and remand for a new trial." Lopes I, 1999 UT 24, ffljl, 21-22. On 
remand, Lopes specifically requested a trial on the enhanced offense, as ordered by this 
Court in Lopes I. (R. 234-84.) Such a request was consistent with the mandatory 
language set forth in Utah R. App. P. 30(b) and Utah R. Crim. P. 28(a). Since the 
judgment of conviction was reversed, a new trial was required to be held "unless 
otherwise specified by the appellate court." Utah R. Crim. P. 28(a). 
The trial court denied Lopes' request in violation of the rules. The trial court's 
ruling was in error. Lopes respectfully requests a remand to the trial court for a new trial 
as initially ordered by this Court in Lopes L 1999 UT 24, ffif 1, 21-22. 
2. According to Case Law, the Trial Court on Remand Must Adhere to This 
Court's Orders. 
Case law provides that on remand, the trial court must comply with the letter and 
the spirit of the appellate court's ruling. In Thurston v. Box Elder County. 835 P.2d 165 
(Utah 1992) (Thurston D. plaintiff sued Box Elder County for wrongful termination of his 
employment. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the County, and 
plaintiff appealed. Id. at 166. On appeal, this Court reversed and remanded the case for a 
determination as to whether the County violated the "County Personnel Management 
10 
Act" when it terminated plaintiff. Id. at 169-70. To the extent such a violation occurred, 
the County would be liable to plaintiff. 
On remand, the County argued to the trial court that the "County Personnel 
Management Act" did not apply. Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1037 
(Utah 1995) ("Thurston ID. The trial court determined the County's argument to be 
beyond the scope of remand and refused to consider the matter. Id 
Thereafter, pursuant to the remand order issued in Thurston L the trial court 
determined that the County violated the Act when it terminated plaintiffs employment, 
and it awarded damages to plaintiff. Thurston II. 892 P.2d at 1037. Both parties appealed 
from the post-remand order. Id. at 1034. For purposes of Lopes' case, this Court's 
analysis concerning the County's argument in the subsequent appeal is relevant, where 
the County argued in Thurston II that it was entitled to have the trial court consider 
whether the Act even applied. In the subsequent appeal, this Court disagreed with the 
County. It determined that under the "law-of-the-case" doctrine, the trial court was 
precluded on remand from considering the County's additional arguments concerning 
application of the Act. Id. at 1037. 
According to the Court, the law-of-the-case doctrine contains a "mandate rule," 
which "dictates that pronouncements of an appellate court on legal issues in a case 
become the law of the case and must be followed in subsequent proceedings of that case." 
11 
Thurston II. 892 P.2d at 1037-38. An appellate court ruling is a mandate that the trial 
court is not at liberty to disregard. "[The] lower court must implement both the letter and 
the spirit of the mandate, taking into account the appellate court's opinion and the 
circumstances it embraces." Id at 1038. "The mandate must be followed even though 
the lower court subsequently addressing the issue may believe that the issue could have 
been better decided in another fashion." Id. 
In Thurston II. this Court recognized that it may have "overstated" application of 
the Act in its earlier decision. Id. at 1039. Nevertheless, its holding on the matter would 
remain the law of the case. Id.; see also Corbett v. Fitzgerald. 709 P.2d 384, 386 (Utah 
1985) ("The express ruling by this court on all issues raised by the prior appeals is 
binding upon the parties, the trial court, and this Court"); Street v. Fourth Judicial District 
Court. 191 P.2d 153, 158 (Utah 1948) (a ruling by an appellate court becomes the "law of 
the case, and the trial court is bound to follow it, even though it considers the ruling 
erroneous"); In re Adoption of BBC. 849 P.2d 769, 772 (Wyo. 1993) (on remand, trial 
court has jurisdiction only to the extent conferred by appellate court's opinion and 
mandate). The law-of-the-case doctrine serves the purpose of ensuring compliance with 
decisions of appellate courts. See Thurston II. 892 P.2d at 1038. 
In Lopes I. this Court gave thoughtful consideration to 66the proper course of 
further proceedings" in the trial court. Lopes I. 1999 UT 24, ^ [21. This Court 
specifically ruled that the judgment of conviction against Lopes would be reversed and 
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the case would be remanded for a new trial. Id.at ffljl, 21-22. Pursuant to the law-of-
the-case doctrine and the mandate rule, the trial court was required to adhere to the letter 
and the spirit of this Court's ruling, and to provide a new trial. The trial court failed to 
do so. Its ruling is in error. Lopes respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial 
court's ruling on remand, and enter an order enforcing the earlier decision in Lopes I. 
C. ON REMAND. JUDGE FUCHS FOUND THAT LOPES HAD ENTERED 
INTO A BIFURCATED PLEA IN JUDGE PEULER'S COURT: 
CONSEQUENTLY. LOPES WAS ENTITLED ONLY TO A MODIFICATION 
OF THE JUDGMENT ON REMAND. THE RECORD OF THE PLEA FAILS 
TO SUPPORT JUDGE FUCHS' RULING. IN ADDITION. JUDGE FUCHS 
DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ENTERTAIN SUCH AN ISSUE OR 
OTHERWISE MODIFY THE JUDGMENT ON REMAND. 
The original trial judge in the Lopes I matter was the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler. 
After Lopes I was issued, the case was remanded to the trial court and assigned to Judge 
Fuchs. As set forth above, during a remand hearing before Judge Fuchs, and in 
accordance with Lopes L 1999 UT 24,1(21, Lopes specifically requested a new trial on 
the enhanced murder charge. (R. 234-84.) The state prosecutor, Rodwicke Ybarra, 
opposed the request. (R. 364:7-12.) 
Ybarra represented to Judge Fuchs that when the parties entered into the Sery plea 
in front of Judge Peuler prior to the original appeal, the state expected that if Lopes 
prevailed on appeal, Lopes would be entitled only to have the enhanced penalty vacated 
and the judgment modified. (R. 364:7-10; see also 363:15-16.) 
In addition, the prosecutor represented that the plea agreement that was entered in 
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front of Judge Peuler was a bifurcated agreement. That is, according to the prosecutor, 
the agreement was unconditional as it related to the elements for murder and the gun 
enhancement, and it was conditional as it related to the elements for the gang enhance-
ment. Thus, according to Ybarra, notwithstanding this Court's ruling in Lopes L Lopes 
would not be entitled to a new trial on the charge of enhanced murder; he would be 
entitled only to a "new trial" on application of the gang enhancement provisions. (R. 
364:7-10.) Thereafter, the prosecutor urged Judge Fuchs to deny Lopes' request for a 
new trial and to enter an order modifying the judgment of conviction. (R. 364:7-12.) 
The trial court found the prosecutor's argument on remand to be persuasive and 
entered an order modifying the judgment against Lopes. (R. 343-45.) 
In considering the matter on appeal, this Court will give no deference to Judge 
Fuchs' ruling, Amex Magnesium, 874 P.2d at 842, particularly since the ruling was in 
error as follows. 
First, the undisputed record of the colloquy fails to support the determination that 
Lopes entered into a bifurcated plea. To the extent that interpretation may be supported 
by the record, the unconditional nature of the plea and its finality were not explained to 
Lopes, placing the validity of the plea into question. If this Court is persuaded that a 
bifurcated plea existed, Lopes should be allowed to withdraw the plea in its entirety since 
he did not enter a knowing and voluntary plea. See infra, point C. 1., herein. 
Second, once Lopes I was issued, to the extent the state believed the plea was 
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bifurcated, and/or that Lopes would be entitled only to an order vacating imposition of the 
enhanced penalty under § 76-3-203.1, the state should have said so in the papers filed 
with this Court, particularly the Petition for Rehearing. In the Petition, the state did not 
address the issue. Thus, the state is "bound by the decision" of Lopes I on remand in all 
further proceedings below. See Thurston II, 892 P.2d at 1038. See infra, point C.2. 
Third, to the extent an issue concerning the conditional/unconditional nature of the 
plea existed, this Court effectively resolved such issue when it ruled that the case would 
be remanded for a new trial on the enhanced offense. Inasmuch as the enhanced offense 
is the charge for enhanced murder, this Court has put the issue to rest. This Court's 
mandate for a new trial must be followed "even though the lower court subsequently 
addressing the issue may believe that the issue could have been better decided in another 
fashion." Thurston IL 892 P.2d at 1038,1039 (even if this Court may have overstated a 
proposition in its earlier decision, that is the law of the case, and will remain so). 
See infra, point C.3., herein. 
Fourth, in the event this Court determines that the issues concerning the nature of 
the plea and the remedy on remand were left open for the trial court to decide, the trial 
court in this matter had only limited powers and authority. Specifically, to the extent the 
trial court had the discretion to resolve any matters that were not addressed by Lopes I 
the trial court's exercise of discretion was limited by statutory law. Utah Code Ann. § 76-
1-402(5) allows the trial court to modify a judgment to reflect a conviction for a lesser 
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penalty only if defendant has requested such relief. In this case, Lopes specifically did 
not request such relief. He requested a new trial. Thus, the trial court abused its 
discretion when it unilaterally entered an order to modify the judgment for the lesser 
penalty. See infra, point C.4., herein. 
Each point relating to the trial court's improper ruling is addressed below. 
1. During the Remand Proceedings, the Prosecutor Represented that the Earlier 
Plea Contained a Conditional Component and an Unconditional Component. The 
Prosecutor's Argument on Remand Places the Integrity of the Plea into Question. 
During the proceedings before Judge Fuchs, the prosecutor opposed the remand for 
a new trial under Lopes I on the basis that Lopes allegedly entered into a bifurcated plea 
before Judge Peuler. According to the prosecutor, Lopes had entered into a conditional 
plea with respect to imposition of the gang enhancement, and an unconditional plea with 
respect to the elements of murder and the gun enhancement. (R. 364:7-10.) In connection 
with his argument, the prosecutor referred Judge Fuchs to the colloquy that occurred in 
Judge Peuler's court prior to the original appeal. 
Judge Fuchs found the prosecutor's argument to be persuasive and ruled that 
Lopes had entered into a bifurcated plea. (R. 343-44.) That ruling is not supported by the 
record, as set forth herein. 
(a) The marshaled evidence and total circumstances support that the plea was 
conditional in its entirety; neither the parties nor the judge mentioned that the plea 
contained an unconditional component. 
The undisputed transcript of the colloquy reflects that during the conditional plea 
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hearing, Judge Peuler informed Lopes that he was being charged with a single, enhanced 
offense (R. 363:10-11 (explaining that Lopes has been charged with a single, first degree 
offense with enhancements)), and that she understood the plea was conditional in nature. 
Judge Peuler stated the following: "I understand that this plea today is in the nature of 
what we call a [Sery] plea.1' (R. 363:14.) Counsel for the defense answered, "That's 
true, Judge." (Id.) The state did not correct that representation. There specifically was 
no indication that the plea was bifurcated or unconditional in any respect. 
Judge Peuler then engaged in the following additional exchange: 
THE COURT [ADDRESSING LOPES]:... If your attorney and you decide to 
appeal the pretrial ruling and you prevail on appeal, that is the appellate court 
decides that I was wrong, and the gang enhancement statute is unconstitutional 
then you would be allowed to withdraw your guilty plea. 
However, if you appeal and you [lose], and the appellate court says that I 
was right, then you're stuck, basically. You can't ask the Court to let you 
withdraw your guilty plea. In other words, what you do today would be 
permanent. Did I make a mis-statement? 
MR. YBARRA [PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, I believe that if the appeal[s] court 
finds that the gang enhancement is not constitutional, it would simply, it would be 
a modification of his sentence. It wouldn't be [permission] to allow him to 
withdraw his guilty plea. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. YBARRA: We'd simply strike that part of the sentence. 
THE COURT: Is that your understanding? 
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MR. PETERSON PEFENSE]: Well, that's not clear. Unfortunately, under 
Gibbons it's unclear whether it would invalidate [and vitiate] the whole plea and 
whether we would have to re-enter a five to [life] plea or not, but Mr. Ybarra may 
be correct. 
THE COURT: Okay. I think Mr. Lopes ought to understand what's possible under 
a [worst-]case scenario so I believe that it's possible under a reading of the case 
[law,] Mr. Lopes[,] that if the appellate court says that I was wrong on the gang 
enhancement statute that you may not be able to withdraw your guilty [plea], you 
may simply have your sentence adjusted. Now, I understand that there may also 
be a possibility that you could withdraw your guilty plea at that time but I'm not 
certain about that and I don't know if anybody is at this point. 
MR. PETERSON: We're not, Judge. 
THE COURT: Okay. So you understand that possibility? 
MR. LOPES: Yes. 
(R. 363:15-16.) Inasmuch as Judge Peuler was not required to adopt or approve of the 
prosecutor's representations and recommendations relating to the nature of the plea, sen-
tencing, or how the matter may proceed after appeal, Judge Peuler did not accept or reject 
the prosecutor's representations. That is, Judge Peuler did not consider the representations 
binding. See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e), (g)(2) (prosecutor's recommendations concerning 
sentencing are not binding on the court), (h)(2) (judge may indicate to the prosecutor 
whether s/he intends to dis/approve of the proposed disposition), (i) (conditional plea 
must be with approval of the court); State v. Smith. 812 P.2d 470,480 (Utah App. 1991) 
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(while state could recommend matters relevant to sentencing, such recommendations 
would not be binding on the court, and defendant was advised of that matter), cert, 
denied. 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992); State v. Wanlass. 953 P.2d 1147, 1148-49 (Utah 
App. 1998) (although parties recommended lesser sentence, trial judge was not bound by 
the recommendation, and did not abuse discretion in ordering otherwise). 
Judge Peuler simply stated that in explaining the matter to Lopes, she intended to 
ensure that he understood the possibilities. Under one scenario, if Lopes prevailed on 
appeal, he may or may not be entitled to withdraw the plea; under another scenario, Lopes 
may or may not receive a modified sentence. (R. 363:15-16); Utah R. Crim. P. 
11(e)(4)(A), (8) (court must ensure defendant understands the nature and elements of the 
offense to which the plea is entered). Judge Peuler anticipated that this Court would 
specify the remand procedures. (R. 363:16.) 
To the extent the prosecutor intended that Lopes would enter into a bifurcated plea, 
that intent was not specified in the record of the plea before Judge Peuler. (See R. 363; 
103-09.) The written agreement failed to specify that the plea was conditional only in 
part and with respect only to certain elements relating to the charge of enhanced murder. 
(See R. 103-09 (written agreement treated enhanced charge as a single offense and did 
not mention either conditional or unconditional nature of the plea).) Also, there was no 
mention in the colloquy of an unconditional component to the plea. (See generally R. 363, 
see also 363:10, 14, where Judge Peuler identified conditional nature of entire plea and 
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prosecutor did not state otherwise.) 
Furthermore, the record reflects that the plea was conditional; it specifically did 
not have the finality that exists with an unconditional plea. (R. 363:10, 14-19.) 
According to Judge Peuler, Lopes would be able to appeal from the entire plea, and he 
may be able to withdraw the plea for a trial on the matter if he prevailed on appeal. (R. 
363:10, 15-16.) Although the prosecutor explained to Judge Peuler what he believed 
should happen on remand if Lopes prevailed on appeal, those representations were not 
binding on Judge Peuler in accepting the plea. Also, the prosecutor did not specify that 
the plea was unconditional with respect to any elements of the offense at issue. Thus, the 
trial judge and Lopes relied on the conditional nature of the matter in entering the plea for 
the enhanced offense. 
To the extent the plea now may be interpreted as bifurcated, where it contains a 
conditional component and an unconditional component, the validity of the plea is 
compromised; the nature of the plea in that respect was not properly disclosed to Lopes. 
Lopes should be allowed to withdraw the plea on the basis that he was not informed of 
the finality of its "unconditional" components. See State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309, 
1313-14 (Utah 1987) (failure to inform defendant of consequences of his plea constitutes 
good cause for invalidating plea and allowing withdrawal of the plea by defendant); U.S. 
v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 570 (1989) (defendant must be instructed in open court with 
respect to the nature of the charge to which the plea relates). 
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(b) The prosecutor claimed in the lower court that defense counsel's references to 
Serv in connection with Lopes 'plea on the gang enhancement elements bifurcated 
the plea. Without more, that assertion is unpersuasive. The marshaled evidence 
reflects that the references to Sery simply served to identify the specific issue that 
was preserved for appeal by the plea. 
In Judge Fuchs' court, the prosecutor seemed to argue that the "unconditional1' 
nature of the plea was supported by the fact that counsel for Lopes made reference to 
State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), when Lopes entered his plea on the 
elements for imposition of the gang enhancement. Specifically, after Judge Peuler stated 
that she understood the plea to be conditional and identified the elements of the offense 
for enhanced murder (R. 363:14, 17-19), counsel for Lopes asked the judge to identify 
the elements ffa piece at a time," to "preserve [Serv] exactly." (R. 363:18.) 
Counsel for the defense also stated, "Your Honor, we wish to enter [a Sery] plea 
relative to the gang enhancement provision under 76-3-203.1" (R. 363:18-19), and he 
advised Lopes to plead to the enhancement elements as "guilty under State v. [Sery], 
because we are specifically [needing] to appeal the Court's ruling on the constitutionality 
of the gang enhancement provision. Again, our problem is, Judge, that the legislature has 
taken [the] fact finding out of the hands of the jury and submitted it to the Court 
unconstitutionally." (R. 363:19.) 
Contrary to the prosecutor's statements during the remand proceedings, that 
portion of the colloquy did not transform the conditional plea into a bifurcated plea with 
an unconditional component, for the following reasons. First, an intent to bifurcate the 
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plea and/or to recognize an unconditional component was not specified by any of the 
parties or the court, as set forth above, point C.l.(a). 
Second, the trial judge specifically identified the plea as conditional in nature. (R. 
363:14.) The trial judge had the discretion to accept or reject the plea. Here, Judge 
Peuler accepted a Sery plea. 
Third, defense counsel's statements relating to Sery simply served to expressly 
define the issue that was preserved for appeal. Sery allows a defendant to enter a 
conditional plea with approval from the court, and specifically to preserve an issue for 
appeal. The issue does not have to dispose of the entire matter. State v. Montoya. 887 
P.2d 857, 859-60 (Utah 1994); State v. Rivera. 943 P.2d 1344, 1345 (Utah 1997) (issue 
preserved for appeal does not have to be dispositive of entire matter). Thus, it was 
perfectly appropriate for Lopes to enter a conditional plea with respect to the entire 
offense of enhanced murder, and preserve for appeal only one aspect of the enhanced 
offense. When counsel for Lopes made reference to Sery during the colloquy, he was 
identifying the precise issue preserved by the conditional plea for appeal: the issue 
concerned the validity of Section 76-3-203.1. The references to Sery in connection with 
references to Section 76-3-203.1 simply identified "as part of the plea agreement,11 the 
specifically preserved issue on appeal. Sery, 758 P.2d at 940. 
Thus, without more, the later references to Sery during the colloquy cannot be 
construed to support anything other than an intent to identify the precise issue that was 
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preserved for appeal under the conditional plea agreement. Since Lopes was not in-
formed that the plea was in any way unconditional, it would be inappropriate to interpret 
the plea as bifurcated at this juncture. Such an interpretation would render the plea 
involuntary, unknowing and invalid. See Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312 (failure to provide 
knowing plea constitutes good cause for withdrawal of the plea). 
Judge Fuchs' ruling concerning a bifurcated plea was erroneous and improper. It 
placed the validity of the plea in question since the record fails to reflect that the 
prosecutor ever disclosed to Judge Peuler or Lopes that the plea contained an 
unconditional component. See id (unknowing nature of plea constitutes good cause for 
withdrawal of the plea). To the extent Judge Fuchs' later interpretation concerning the 
plea may be upheld, Lopes respectfully requests the opportunity to withdraw the plea 
since it was not knowing or voluntary. Id; see also Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) (illegal 
sentence may be corrected at any time). 
2. The State Led this Court to Believe that the Plea Was Conditional in its 
Entirety. In the Brief Filed in Connection with Lopes L the State Asked the Court 
to Affirm the Conviction on the Entire Offense. Such a Request Would Have 
Been Unnecessary if the State Really Believed that the Plea Was Bifurcated. In 
Addition, in the "Petition for Rehearing." the State Did Not Seek to Correct Any 
Alleged Misunderstandings Concerning the Nature of the Plea. 
On appeal in Lopes L both Lopes and the state represented that Lopes entered into 
a conditional plea in connection with the entire enhanced murder charge. (Seejkief of 
Appellant, dated April 30, 1997, at 3-4 ("Lopes entered a guilty plea to the criminal 
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homicide charge plus gun and gang enhancements, pursuant to State v. Sery"): Brief of 
Appellee, dated July 23, 1997, at 3-4 and 46 ("defendant pleaded guilty to murder and 
acquiesced in the court's discretion to sentence him under the gun and group criminal 
activity enhancements, in exchange for the dismissal of other charges, and conditioning 
his plea on the right to appeal" pursuant to Sery).) Thus, at the time of the original 
appeal, the state apparently did not believe that the plea was bifurcated. Rather, the state 
seemed to recognize that if Lopes prevailed on appeal, this Court may reverse the 
conviction for enhanced murder. (See. Brief of Appellee at 46.) 
Thereafter, when the Court issued its opinion in Lopes L the state petitioned this 
Court for rehearing. (See.Petition for Rehearing, dated March 30, 1999.) Significantly, 
while the state was aware that this Court had remanded the matter for a new trial on the 
charge for enhanced murder, the state made no mention in its petition of its claim that the 
plea was bifurcated. The state failed to disclose to the Court that it was taking the 
position that Lopes was entitled only to have the enhanced portion of the sentence 
vacated, that Lopes would only be entitled to a modification of the judgment, or that the 
remand order was in any way inconsistent with the conditional plea agreement entered by 
the parties. (See Petition for Rehearing in general.) 
A petition for rehearing provides a mechanism whereby a party may petition this 
Court for reconsideration of a matter with respect to any aspect of the decision. See 
Thurston IL 892 P.2d at 1038; Utah R. App. P. 35(a) (2000) (petition for rehearing 
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"shall" state the points of "law" or "fact" that the court has "overlooked" or 
"misapprehended"). When the state petitioned for rehearing in this case, it remained 
silent with respect to the Court's order concerning the "proper course of further 
proceedings for this case." See Lopes L 1999 UT 24, [^21. Rather, the state determined 
only to discuss the analysis concerning the constitutionality of § 76-3-203.1. If the state 
believed that this Court misapprehended or misunderstood the nature of the plea, and/or 
that Lopes would be entitled only to a modified judgment on the matter, the state should 
have raised the matter to this Court on rehearing. The state could have presented the 
issues on rehearing that were set forth in the petition, and alerted this Court to its 
understanding concerning the alleged bifurcated plea, in order to correct any and all 
misapprehensions that the state perceived existed in the opinion. Because the state did 
not identify any concern with respect to the order for a new trial, the state is bound by the 
decision of Lopes I in all further proceedings below. 
It was improper for the trial court to revisit the issue on remand, and to enter an 
order inconsistent with this Court's ruling on the matter. 
3. To the Extent There Were Any Lingering Questions Concerning the Nature of 
the Plea, this Court Effectively Resolved Them in Lopes L 
As set forth above, the "mandate rule" requires a lower court to comply with an 
appellate court's order on remand. See supra, point B.2., herein. In Slatterv v. Covey & 
Co., Inc., 909 P.2d 925, 927-28 (Utah App. 1995), the court of appeals recognized an 
exception to the "mandate rule." The rule does not apply when an issue is "left open by 
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an appellate decision." Id. at 928. In that instance, the trial court has discretion to deal 
with the issue as it sees fit, including allowing supplemental filings or proceedings. The 
Slattery court determined that if a trial court is asked to consider a matter on remand, the 
pivotal question is, to what extent does the earlier appeal decide the issue now before the 
court. Id at 928. 
In considering that question in Lopes' case, it is plain that this Court gave special 
consideration to the continued proceedings on remand in the trial court. While this 
Court had the power and the authority to vacate the gang enhancement imposed against 
Lopes in the judgment of conviction, it specifically did not do so. Lopes L 1999 UT 24, 
ffi[l, 21-22; see also Utah R. App. 30(b); State v. Helmick 2000 UT 70, fl7, 402 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 27 (vacating gang enhancement where imposition violated defendant's rights 
under Lopes I). 
Rather, this Court specifically addressed "the proper course of further proceedings 
in this case" on remand. Lopes L 1999 UT 24, [^21. It ruled that the case would be 
"reverse[d] and remandfed] for a new trial on the gang enhancement charge." ldjat Ififl, 
21-22. Since the gang enhancement statute created a new, greater "enhanced offense" 
that must be presented to a jury for determination, the matter would be remanded to the 
trial court for proper application. 
On remand, the trial court exceeded its authority when it revisited "the proper 
course of further proceedings in [the] case." Id.at %l\. This Court did not leave that 
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issue open, where the issue was specifically addressed in the appeal. 
4. To the Extent this Court "Left Open" the Question as to Whether the Trial 
Court Could Modify the Judgment Against Lopes on Remand. Utah Statutory 
Law Governs and Prohibits the Trial Court from Modifying a Judgment Except 
When the Defendant Specifically Makes Such a Request. 
In the event this Court determines that its decision in Lopes I left open the issues 
concerning the nature of the plea and/or the prosecutor's offer to withdraw imposition of 
the gang enhancement against Lopes (see supra, point C.l), the trial court had "discretion 
to deal with those issues as it [saw] fit, including allowing supplement filings or 
proceedings." Slatterv. 909 P.2d at 928 (citing Street v. Fourth Judicial District Court 
191 P.2d 153,158 (Utah 1948)). 
In exercising discretion, the trial court must comply with the law. Otherwise, 
discretion is abused. See Gibbons, 779 P.2d at 1135-36; State v. Woodland. 945 P.2d 
665, 671 (Utah 1997); State v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851, 861 (Utah 1992); State v. Elm. 808 
P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1991) (record reflected that trial judge fully complied with 
statutory requirements; therefore, no abuse of discretion); State v. Russell. 791 P.2d 188, 
192-93 (Utah 1990); State v. McCovev. 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990) ("An abuse of 
discretion results when the judge Tails to consider all legally relevant factors1"); State v. 
Cobb. 774 P.2d 1123, 1129 (Utah 1989) (judge's discretion in sentencing lies within 
limits prescribed by law); State v. Kellv. 784 P.2d 144, 146 (Utah 1989) (discretion is 
within statutory limits); State v. Jolivet. 712 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1986) (discretion in 
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sentencing is limited by law); State v. Peterson. 681 P.2d 1210, 1219-20 (Utah 1984) 
(statutory law prescribes the bounds of the trial court's discretion). 
The law applicable to the matter in this case prohibits a judge from modifying a 
judgment and entering a conviction for a lesser penalty unless the defendant specifically 
requests such relief. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) provides the following: 
If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate court on 
appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence to support a 
conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to support a 
conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact necessarily found every fact 
required for conviction of that included offense, the verdict or judgment of 
conviction may be set aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction entered for 
the included offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such relief is sought by 
the defendant. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) (1999); see also Dunn. 850 P.2d at 1209 (this Court would 
not force application of Section 76-1-402(5), where Dunn did not seek entry of judgment 
for lesser sentence). 
In this matter, after this Court "reversed" Lopes' conviction on appeal and "re-
manded" the case for a "new trial," Lopes L 1999 UT 24,1fl|l, 21-22, Lopes specifically 
did not seek entry of a reduced or lesser judgment. Rather, he sought enforcement of this 
Court's ruling. Consequently, the trial judge did not have the authority or the power on 
remand to enter a modified judgment. The trial judge's order modifying Lopes' sentence 
constituted an abuse of discretion. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5); Utah R. Crim. P. 
28(a) (2000); Utah R. App. P. 30(b) (2000); see also infra, note 1, herein. Lopes requests 
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that this Court reverse and remand the case to enforce its prior ruling. 
D. THE PROSECUTOR APPARENTLY MISUNDERSTOOD THIS COURT'S 
ANALYSIS IN LOPES I AND ADVANCED A CONFUSING 
INTERPRETATION OF THE CASE. THE CONFUSING INTERPRETATION 
IS REFLECTED IN THE TRIAL JUDGE'S WRITTEN ORDER AND SHOULD 
BE CORRECTED. 
On remand in the trial court, the state seemed to argue that according to this 
Court's ruling in Lopes L Lopes would be entitled to a new trial only with respect to 
imposition of the enhanced penalty under Section 76-3-203.1. (R. 364:9 (prosecutor 
claims "new trial" on the section "76-3-203.1 charge" relates only to a trial on application 
of the enhanced penalty).) That is an incorrect interpretation of Lopes I. 
Specifically, in Lopes L this Court recognized that the gang-enhancement statute 
had the effect of transforming an underlying offense into a new, greater, enhanced offense 
with a higher punishment. Lopes L 1999 UT 24, f 15. Thus, the "enhanced offense" 
consisted of the elements of the underlying crime and the Section 76-3-203.1 elements. 
That is consistent with the way in which this Court has construed application of 
elements relating to other enhancement provisions. In Lopes L this Court found that the 
gang enhancement provisions operated in a manner similar to the firearm enhancement. 
This Court recognized that with respect to the firearm enhancement, while the provisions 
transformed an underlying crime into a new, greater offense, the enhancement provisions 
did not create "a separate offense that the State had to plead as a separate crime." Lopes 
I, 1999 UT 24,^12. 
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"When the matter is looked at correctly and realistically, it is seen that there is but 
one criminal act charged, but describing it accurately brings it within the higher 
penalty prescribed by law: to-wit, an aggravated assault which was committed with 
a firearm."... [The] legislature, by enacting the firearm enhancement, had 
increased the degree of the crime by establishing a separate set of elements that, if 
proven, warranted a higher punishment. Importantly for present purposes, we 
concluded in [State v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992 (Utah 1978),] that while the State did 
not need to separately charge the enhancement as a crime, it did need to prove each 
element, including the defendant's use of a firearm, beyond a reasonable doubt 
because the crime was increased as to degree by the presence of the firearm. 
Lopes L 1999 UT 24, ^ 12 (citing Angus. 581 P.2d at 994-95). 
According to this Court, when the legislature enacted the gang enhancement 
provision "it acted just as it did when it passed the firearm provision." Id. at ^ |15. The 
gang enhancement provisions essentially transformed the underlying offense into a new, 
greater offense of a higher degree. The state would not be required to separately charge 
the enhancement as a crime, but would need to prove each of the additional elements to 
establish the greater, enhanced offense.1 
Based on that analysis, it is plain that this Court's order of remand for a "new trial" 
1
 In enacting Section 76-3-203.1, the legislature specified that the statute did not 
create an offense separate and distinct from the underlying crime. See Utah Code Ann. 
76-3-203.l(5)(a). That provision remained intact in Lopes I. While the enhancement 
statute does not create an offense separate and distinct from the underlying offense, it 
serves to transform the underlying offense into a new and greater offense. In that sense 
an enhanced offense {i.e. enhanced murder) and an underlying offense without 
enhancements {i.e. murder) are in a relationship of greater and lesser-included offenses. 
The enhanced offense cannot be committed without necessarily having committed the 
underlying offense. See State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 156 (Utah 1983). 
Thus, the "enhanced offense" or the "section 76-3-203.1 charge" in the context of 
this case is the offense of enhanced murder. 
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on the enhanced offense or the "section 76-3-203.1 charge" contemplated a new trial on 
the greater, Section 76-3-203.1 offense for enhanced murder. 
Stated another way, contrary to the prosecutor's assertions to Judge Fuchs, a "gang 
enhancement" is not a separate offense in this state that may be charged on its own or 
separate from the underlying crime. Rather, the enhancement provision simply defines 
additional elements that must be established by the state together with the elements for 
the underlying offense to create the "enhanced offense." The enhancement provisions 
serve to transform an underlying offense into a greater offense with a greater penalty. 
Thus, this Court's order for a new trial necessarily related to the entire "Section 76-3-
203.1 charge" of enhanced murder.2 
CONCLUSION 
Lopes respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's order 
modifying the judgment, and remand the case for a new trial on the enhanced murder 
charge as originally ordered in Lopes I. 
2
 Lopes was unable to find a case since Lopes I wherein this Court has treated the 
Section 76-3-203.1 provisions in the fashion argued by the state below. That is, this 
Court has not indicated that Section 76-3-203.1 should be charged individually as a 
separate crime. Rather, the provisions combine the underlying offense with the 
enhancement provisions to transform the single criminal act into a greater, "enhanced" 
offense. Indeed, this Court has consistently treated Section 76-3-203.1 as defining the 
enhancement elements for a greater, enhanced offense. To prove an "enhanced crime," 
the state must establish the enhancement provisions and the underlying offense. See e.g. 
Helmick. 2000 UT 70, f 14 (recognizing that Section 76-3-203.1 contains only the 
enhancement elements of the greater offense). 
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76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal 
episode — Included offenses. 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all 
separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the 
same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses 
which may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this 
code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or 
conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under 
any other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single 
criminal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a 
defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the 
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense 
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included 
offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of prepa-
ration to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included 
therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an 
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate 
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence 
to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient 
evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact 
necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included offense, 
the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a 
judgment of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a 
new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant. 
76-3-203.1. Offenses committed by three or more persons 
— Enhanced penalties. 
(1) (a) A person who commits any offense listed in Subsection (4) in concert 
with two or more persons is subject to an enhanced penalty for the offense 
as provided below. 
(b) "In concert with two or more persons* as used in this section means 
the defendant and two or more other persons would be criminally liable for 
the offense as parties under Section 76-2-202. 
(2) (a) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an indictment is returned, 
shall cause to be subscribed upon the complaint in misdemeanor cases or 
the information or indictment in felony cases notice that the defendant is 
subject to the enhanced penalties provided under this section. 'The notice 
shall be in a clause separate from and in addition to the substantive 
offense charged. 
(b) If the subscription is not included initially, the court may subse-
quently allow the prosecutor to amend the charging document to include 
the subscription if the court finds the charging documents, including any 
statement of probable cause, provide notice to the defendant of the 
allegation he committed the offense in concert with two or more persons, 
or if the court finds the defendant has not otherwise been substantially 
prejudiced by the omission. 
(3) The enhanced penalties for offenses committed under this section are: 
(a) If the offense is a class B misdemeanor, the convicted person shall 
serve a minimum term of 90 consecutive days in a jail or other secure 
correctional facility. 
(b) If the offense is a class A misdemeanor, the convicted person shall 
serve a minimum term of 180 consecutive days in a jail or other secure 
correctional facility. 
(c) If the offense is a third degree felony, the convicted person shall be 
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of three years in prison. 
(d) If the offense is a second degree felony, the convicted person shall be 
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of six years in prison. 
(e) If the offense is a first degree felony, the convicted person shall be 
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of nine years in prison. 
(f) If the offense is a capital offense for which a life sentence is imposed, 
the convicted person shall be sentenced to a minimum term of 20 years in 
prison. 
(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are: 
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, 37a, 37b, or 37c, 
regarding drug-related offenses; 
(b) assault and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 1; 
(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 2; 
(d) kidnapping and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 3; 
(e) any felony sexual offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Pant 4; 
(f) sexual exploitation of a minor as defined in Section 76-5a-3; 
(g) any property destruction offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 1; 
(h) burglary, criminal trespass, and related offenses under Title 76, 
Chapter 6, Part 2; 
(i) robbery and aggravated robbery under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3; 
(j) theft and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 4; 
(k) any fraud offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 5, except Sections 
76-6-503, 76-6-504, 76-6-505, 76-6-507, 76-6-508, 76-6-509, 76-6-510, 76-
6-511, 76-6-512, 76-6-513, 76-6-514, 76-6-516, 76-6-517, 76-6-518, and 
76-6-520; 
(1) any offense of obstructing government operations under Part 3, Title 
76, Chapter 8, except Sections 76-8-302, 76-8-303, 76-8-304, 76-8-307, 
76-8-308, and 76-8-312; 
(m) tampering with a witness or other violation of Section 76-8-508; 
(n) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal proceeding as defined in 
Section 76-8-509; 
(o) any explosives offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 3; 
(p) any weapons offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 5; 
(q) pornographic and harmful materials and performances offenses 
under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 12; 
(r) prostitution and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 13; 
(s) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 15, Bus Passenger Safety 
Act; 
(t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 16, Pattern of Unlawful 
Activity Act; 
(u) communications fraud as defined in Section 76-10-1801; 
(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 19, Money Laundering 
and Currency Transaction Reporting Act; and 
(w) burglary of a research facility as defined in Section 76-10-2002. 
(5) (a) This section does not create any separate offense but provides an 
enhanced penalty for the primary offense. 
(b) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced penalties under this section 
that the persons with whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert 
are not identified, apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that any of those 
persons are charged with or convicted of a different or lesser offense. 
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the jury shall decide whether to 
impose the enhanced penalty under this section. The imposition of the 
penalty is contingent upon a finding by the sentencing judge that this 
section is applicable. In conjunction with sentencing the court shall enter 
written findings of fact concerning the applicability of this section. 
(6) The court may suspend the imposition or execution of the sentence 
required under this section if the court: 
(a) finds that the interests of justice would be best served; and 
(b) states the specific circumstances justifying the disposition on the 
record and in writing. 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 28- Disposition after appeal. 
(a) If a judgment of conviction is reversed, a new trial shall be held unless 
otherwise specified by the appellate court. Pending a new trial or other 
proceeding, the defendant shall be detained, or released upon bail, or other-
wise restricted as the trial court on remand determines proper. If no further 
trial or proceeding is to be had a defendant in custody shall be discharged, and 
a defendant restricted by bail or otherwise shall be released from restriction 
and bail exonerated and any deposit of funds or property refunded to the 
proper person. 
(b) Upon affirmance by the appellate court, the judgment or order affirmed 
or modified shall be executed. 
(c) Unless otherwise ordered by the trial court, within 30 days after receipt 
of the remittitur, the trial court shall notify the parties and place the matter on 
the calendar for review. 
(Amended effective May 1, 1993.) 
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MR. YBARRA: That is correct. At the change 
of plea colloquy we said that would be our result if 
he successfully appealed. 
MR. PETERSON: May I request the State 
prepare an order from these findings today? 
THE COURT: Will you do that, please? So I 
can sign that. In case he wants to take it back up, 
he can do so. 
MR. PETERSON: All right. 
MR. YBARRA: Do you want me to include the 
fact that you're striking the gang enhancement? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. YBARRA: Pursuant to our position? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. PETERSON: Thank you, very much, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. 
And we need to prepare a new commitment 
order. Just strike the gang enhancement language. 
(Proceedings concluded) 
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ADDENDUM B 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
RODWICKE YBARRA, 4184 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
CAMERON T. LOPES, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW & ORDER, RE: DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO BE AFFORDED A JURY 
TRIAL ON CRIMINAL HOMICIDE 
CHARGE 
Case No. 961900885 FS 
Hon. Dennis M. Fuchs 
WHEREAS the above-styled case came on for hearing on 29 November 1999 at 8:30 
a.m., on the defendant's motion to be afforded a jury trial on the criminal homicide charge; the 
defendant being present and represented by his attorney, Mr. Michael A. Peterson, Salt Lake 
Legal Defender's Association; the state being represented by its attorney, Mr. Rodwicke Ybarra, 
Deputy District Attorney for Salt Lake County; the court having previously read the defendant's 
memorandum and the transcript of the change of plea hearing occurring on 7 August 1996; the 
court having received and carefully considered the arguments of the parties; and otherwise being 
fully informed in the premises; 
NOW THEREFORE, the court makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The defendant entered separate pleas to the criminal homicide charge, to the gang 
enhancement and to the gun enhancement at the change of plea hearing on 7 August 1996. 
2. The defendant's conditional Sery plea was only as to the gang enhancement. 
FILED DIS ICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MAR 0 2 2000 
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ORDER, RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO BE AFFORDED A JURY TRIAL ON 
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE CHARGE 
Case No. 961900885 FS 
Page 2 
3. During the plea colloquy on 7 August 1999, Judge Peuler made it very 
understandable to the defendant that one possible effect of a successful appeal of her ruling on 
the constitutionality of the gang enhancement would be that he might not be able to withdraw his 
guilty plea to the criminal homicide charge, but rather only have his sentence adjusted. 
4. The remand from the Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Lopes, ordered only that the 
defendant be allowed "a new trial on the section 76-3-203.1 charge." 
5. Upon remand, the state moved to dismiss the gang enhancement consistent with 
its stated agreement at the change of plea hearing. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The defendant was informed prior to his entry of plea to the murder charge and 
gun enhancement of the possible consequence that should he prevail on his appeal of the 
consitutionality of the gang enhancement he might not be entitled to withdraw his plea to the 
murder charge but only have his sentence modified. 
2. In accordance with the order of the Utah Supreme Court, the defendant is only 
entitled to a trial on the §76-3-203.1 (gang enhancement) charge, not on the criminal homicide 
charge with gun enhancement. 
ORDER 
1. Based upon the State's motion, the gang enhancement, §76-3-203.1, is hereby 
ordered dismissed. 
2. The defendant's sentence shall be modified to delete that portion attributable to 
the gang enhancement, §76-3-203.1. 
3. The defendant's motion for a trial on the criminal homicide, murder charge is 
hereby denied. 
00344 
ORDER, RE: DEFENDANTS MOTION TO BE AFFORDED A JURY TRIAL ON 
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE CHARGE 
Case No. 961900885 FS 
Page 3 
DATED this / J day of 
Approved as to form 
2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
DENNIS M. FUCHS, District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order, Re: Defendant's 
Motion To Be Afforded A Jury Trial On Criminal Homicide Charge was delivered to Michael A. 
Peterson, Attorney for Defendant CAMERON T. LOPES, at 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111 on the vj'May of January, 2000. 
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it's a foregone conclusion win on "as-a-partyn. You 
cannot have the two coincide. It's a logical 
impossibility. 
THE COURT: The Court is going to deny your 
motion for the following reasons. 
One, I think during the plea colloquy -- I 
think that Judge Peuler made it very understandable to 
Mr. Lopes -- if I mispronounce that, I apologize --
that his appeal of the gang enhancement could be 
overturned but, under the worst case scenario, it 
wouldn't affect his pleas on the other charges, being 
the homicide and being the gun enhancement. 
And, in fact, I think she was very specific. 
Again, at your request Mr. Peterson. In reading 
the -- the transcript, that she took a plea to each 
separately• 
I don't think there's any question but it 
was a knowing and intelligent plea entered to the 
homicide. There was a knowing, intelligent plea to 
the gun enhancement. And there was a Serv plea 
entered in regard to the gang enhancement. 
In reading the case from the Supreme Court 
in reversing and remanding, the argument was he had to 
be tried on the new enhancement or on the enhancement. 
I agree with you that if the State agreed to go 
PO^ifi 
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forward on the enhancement, it would probably have to 
be a trial on more than the one charge. However, I 
think the State is willing to and they have been --
they have dismissed the enhancement. They don't plan 
on pursuing the enhancement, and I don't think there ! 
is anything in the order of the Supreme Court that 
requires Mr. Lopes to be allowed to withdraw all of 
the pleas and go back to trial on the homicide either. 
If that was their intent, they will have to 
make it a lot more clear than they did in their 
decision in this case. You will have to go back up 
there. 
So, I think that his plea was knowing and 
voluntary. 
I am not saying it's not timely. I'm not 
buying that argument. I think he has been back --as 
soon as the decision was rendered, he has been back in 
regards to the gang enhancement. 
So, for those reasons, I am denying your 
motion. I think his plea was knowingly and 
intelligently made. I don't think the Supreme Court 
decision requires that he be given a new trial on all 
charges. I think the State is dismissing the gang 
enhancement or has dismissed the gang enhancement and 
I think the only thing Mr. Lopes is entitled to is --
0.0^47 
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I don't even know if Judge Peuler resentenced him or 
not. 
MR. YBARRA: I don't believe she has. 
THE COURT: I think he might be entitled to a 
modification to the sentence accordingly striking the 
gang enhancement. And I would do that unless you 
would request a hearing in regards to sentencing. 
Again, the Court would just go ahead and issue a 
modified commitment striking the consecutive gang 
enhancement• 
And also in regard to the party to the 
offense, the Supreme Court has not ruled the language 
in criminal statutes which provide for one to be 
guilty to -- as a party to the offense, they have not 
said that is unconstitutional and, in fact, that has 
been challenged and held many times. 
Do you have need for any clarification? 
MR. PETERSON: Judge, we don't -- we don't 
need a separate hearing for additional sentencing. We 
would, however, need a new commitment order. 
THE COURT: We will give a new commitment 
striking the consecutive gang enhancement language. 
MR. PETERSON: I want to make crystal clear 
that the State has, in fact, dismissed the gang 
enhancement provisions on Mr. Lopes. 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
Rule 30. Decision of the court: dismissal; notice of deci-
sion. 
(a) Decision in civil cases. The court may reverse, affirm, modify, or 
otherwise dispose of any order or judgment appealed from. If the findings of 
fact in a case are incomplete, the court may order the trial court or agency to 
supplement, modify, or complete the findings to make them conform to the 
issues presented and the facts as found from the evidence and may direct the 
trial court or agency to enter judgment in accordance with the findings as 
revised. The court may also order a new trial or further proceedings to be 
conducted. If a new trial is granted, the court may pass upon and determine all 
questions of law involved in the case presented upon the appeal and necessary 
to the final determination of the case. 
(b) Decision in criminal cases. If a judgment of conviction is reversed, a new 
trial shall be held unless otherwise specified by the court. If a judgment of 
conviction or other order is affirmed or modified, the judgment or order 
affirmed or modified shall be executed. 
(c) Decision and opinion in writing; entry of decision. When a judgment, 
decree, or order is reversed, modified, or the reasons shall be stated concisely 
in writing and filed with the clerk. Any justice or judge concurring or 
dissenting may likewise give reasons in writing and file the same with the 
clerk. The entry by the clerk in the records of the court shall constitute the 
entry of the judgment of the court. 
(d) Decision without opinion. If, after oral argument, the court concludes 
that a case satisfies the criteria set forth in Rule 31(b), it may dispose of the 
case by order without written opinion. The decision shall have only such effect 
as precedent as is provided for by Rule 31(f). 
(e) Notice of decision. Immediately upon the entry of the decision, the clerk 
shall give notice to the respective parties and make the decision public in 
accordance with the direction of the court. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
Cameron Thomas LOPES, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 960551. 
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to commit the same underlying offense; and 
(2> directly committed the underlying offense 
or solicited,, requested, commanded, encour-
aged, or intentionally aided one of the other 
two actors to engage in conduct .constituting 
the underlying offense. U.C.A.1953, 76-3-
2G3.1(l)(a, b), 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 16, 1999. 
Rehearing Denied June 23, 1999. 
Defendant pled guilty in the Third Dis-
trict Court, Salt Lake County, Sandra N. 
Peuler, J., to charge of murder, with firearm 
and gang enhancements, and he appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held 
that: (1) application of "gang enhancement" 
statute to enhance sentence of defendant 
convicted of murder violated defendant's due 
process rights, and (2) subsection of gang 
enhancement statute which provides that tri-
al judge, rather than jury, will decide 
whether to impose enhancement violated de-
fendant's right to jury trial under state con-
stitution. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Russon, J., filed a dissenting opinion in 
which Howe, C.J., joined. 
1. Criminal Law <3>1134(3) 
A constitutional challenge to a statute 
presents a question of law, which the Su-
preme Court reviews for correctness. 
2. Constitutional Law <3=>48( 1,3) 
When addressing a constitutional chal-
lenge to the validity of a statute, the Su-
preme Court presumes that the statute is 
valid, and resolves any reasonable doubts in 
favor of constitutionality. 
3. Criminal Law <£=>13(2) 
The legislature has broad authority to 
define crimes and prescribe punishments. 
4. Criminal Law <3=>1208.6<1) 
Under "gang enhancement" statute, 
state is required to prove that all three ac-
tors: (1) possessed a mental state sufficient 
5. Criminal Law <^1208.6(1) 
For purposes of gang enhancement stat-
ute, phrase "in concert" means that the de-
fendant acted with at least two other people 
and that those other persons must also be 
liable for the underlying offense. U.C.A. 
1953, 76-3-203.1(l)(a, b). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
6. Constitutional Law <3>270(2) 
Criminal Law <s=>1208.6(5) 
Application of "gang enhancement" stat-
ute to enhance sentence of defendant con-
victed of murder violated defendant's due 
process rights, where state failed to prove 
accomplices' criminal culpability beyond a 
reasonable doubt. U.CA.1953, 76-3-
203.1(l)(a, b). 
7. Jury <3=>31.1 
Gang enhancement statute creates new 
offense separate from that underlying en-
hancement, and thus subsection of statute 
which provides that trial judge, rather than 
jury, will decide whether to impose enhance-
ment violated defendant's right to jury trial 
under state constitution. Const. Art. 1, § 12; 
U.CA1953, 76-3-203.1(l)(a, b) 
8. Constitutional Law <3>48(1) 
Statutes, where possible, are to be con-
strued so as to sustain their constitutionality. 
9. Statutes ®»64(1) 
If a portion of an otherwise unconstitu-
tional statute might be saved by severing the 
unconstitutional provision, such should be 
done. 
10. Statutes e=64(l) 
To determine if a statute is severable 
from its unconstitutional subsection, the Su-
preme Court looks to legislative intent 
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11. Statutes ®=>64(1) 
If the legislative intent behind a statute 
is not expressly stated, the Supreme Court, 
in order to determine the severability of an 
unconstitutional provision, then turns to the 
statute itself, and examines the remaining 
constitutional portion of the statute in rela-
tion to the stricken portion. 
12. Statutes <S=>64(1) 
If the portion of the statute remaining 
after an unconstitutional provision is stricken 
is operable and still furthers the intended 
legislative purpose, the statute will be al-
lowed to stand. 
13. Statutes <s=»64(6) 
Subsection of gang enhancement statute 
which unconstitutionally requires trial judge, 
rather than jury, to decide whether to impose 
enhancement, would be severed from remain-
der of statute; severance would not destroy 
statute's purpose of imposing higher penal-
ties when offense is committed by three per-
sons acting in concert Const Art 1, § 12; 
U.CA.1953, 76-S-203.1(l)(a, b). 
Jan Graham, Atty. Gen., Kenneth A. Bron-
ston, Asst Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff. 
Linda M. Jones, Michael A. Peterson, Kim-
berly A. Clark, Salt Lake City, for defendant 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
H 1 Cameron Thomas Lopes appeals from 
a judgment and conviction for murder, a first 
degree felony, and enhanced sentences Im-
posed by the district court pursuant to sec-
tions 76-3-203(1) and -203.1 of the Utah 
Code. Lopes asks this court to reverse the 
group criminal activity enhancement on the 
basis that section 76-3-203 J^ violates both 
the federal and Utah constitutions. We hold 
1. Lopes refers to section 76-3-203.1 as the 
"gang" enhancement statute. The State correct-
ly points out in its brief that the legislature did 
not create a "gang" enhancement, although the 
statute is popularly known by that name. We 
agree with the State that referring to the statute 
as a "group criminal activity" enhancement is 
more accurate than "gang" enhancement. Nev-
ertheless, we have previously referred to the stat-
ute under its commonly known name, see State v. 
that the application of section 76-3-203.1 in 
this case did deprive Lopes of certain funda-
mental constitutional rights. Furthermore, 
we hold subsection (5)(c) of section 76-3-
203.1 violates the Utah Constitution. We, 
therefore, reverse and remand for a new 
trial. 
12 In March of 1996, the State charged 
Lopes and several other individuals with 
murder, a first degree felony, in violation of 
section 76-5-203 of the Utah Code. The in-
formation alleged that early in the morning 
of February 22, 1996, Lopes, along with 
three other persons who were parties to the 
offense, went to the residence of Jimmy De-
Herrera with the intent to kill the occupants. 
One of the defendants fired two shots from a 
.20 gauge shotgun into an open window. 
Both shots hit and killed Joey Miera, who 
was asleep on the floor. The information 
further alleged that the defendants shot Mi-
era in retaliation for another shooting one 
week earlier that killed one of the defen-
dants friends. The information also gave 
notice to Lopes that he was subject to en-
hanced penalties for the use of a firearm, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(1) 
(Supp.1998) ("firearm enhancement"), and for 
having acted in concert wiith two or more 
persons, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-
3-203.1 (1995) ("group criminal activity" or 
"gang" enhancement).1 Lopes waived his 
preliminary hearing and agreed to be bound 
over to the district court 
H 3 In the district court, Lopes moved to 
strike the gang enhancement as unconstitu-
tional under both the state and federal con-
stitutions. The court denied his motion. 
Thereafter, he pleaded guilty to the homicide 
offense, with enhancements, in exchange for 
dismissal of charges pending against him in 
another case. Lopes conditioned his plea 
pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah 
CtApp.1988).2 Lopes's conditional plea pre-
Alvarez. 872 P.2d 450, 461 (Utah 1994). and we 
will continue to do so for ease of reference. 
2. The Sery decision, which this court has en-
dorsed, see State v. Rivera, 943 P.2d 1344, 1344-
45 (Utah 1997); Utah RJCnm. P. ll(i), permits a 
criminal -defendant to plead guilty while preserv-
ing issues for appeal. In this case, Lopes specifi-
cally preserved his right to appeal the constitu-
tionality of the gang enhancement statute. 
STATE 
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served his right to. challenge the constitution-
ality of the gang enhancement statute. -
14 Thereafter, the trial court issued find-
ings that Lopes was subject to an enhanced 
penalty under section 76-^-20311 "and entered 
judgment against him.1 The trial court sen-
tenced Lopes to an indeterminate term of 
five years to life. The court also enhanced 
the sentence under the gang enhancement 
statute, sentencing Lopes to an additional 
four years to "run consecutively and not con-
currently with the basic sentence." Lopes 
appeals that order. 
115 Lopes contends that the gang enhance-
ment statute creates a separate criminal of-
fense by combining a separate mental ele-
ment—"in concert"—with a criminal act and, 
therefore, for the statute to satisfy state and 
federal due process concerns, the State must 
prove the elements of the enhancement be-
yond a reasonable doubt, as with any other 
crime. He also asserts that section 76-3-
203.1(5)(c) interferes with his right to a jury 
trial, as guaranteed by article I, section 12 of 
the Utah Constitution.4 
[1,2] 16 A constitutional challenge to a 
statute presents a question of law, which 
we review for correctness. See State v. 
Moh% 901 P.2d 991. 995 (Utah 1995). 
When addressing su^n a challenge, this 
court presumes that the statute is valid, 
and we resolve any reasonable doubts in 
flavor of constitutionality. See Society of 
3. Lopes objected to the first paragraph of the 
judge's findings and conclusions regarding appli-
cability of the gang enhancement statute because 
the judge had suggested that the issue was 
waived. As first written, that paragraph stated* 
In his Statement of Defendant [sic] executed in 
connection with his entry of guilty plea and in 
his colloquy with the court, the defendant, 
although challenging its constitutionality, ac-
knowledged the applicability of the gang en-
hancement as pleaded by the state 
After objection, the first paragraph was changed 
to read: 
Defendant admitted that he went with at least 
two other people to Joey Miera s home for the 
purpose of retalianng for a fellow gang mem-
bers shooting, and with the stated purpose of 
"[getting the punks." 
Bv making this modification, the tnal court 
acknowledged that Lopes never conceded that all 
the elements of the enhancement statute were 
satisfied, i.e., that the other individuals shared 
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Separatumists, Inc. u Whitehead, 870 P.2d 
916, 920 (Utah 1993); Mountain States Tel 
& Tel Ca v. Garfield County, 811 P.2d 184, 
187 (Utah 1991). 
[3] 17 In response to. Lopes's argument 
that in enacting the gang enhancement stat-
ute, the legislature created a new crime, the 
State notes that the legislature specifically 
expressed an intent that the gang enhance-
ment not be a separate offense. The legisla-
ture does have broad authority to define 
crimes and prescribe punishments. See 
State v. Bishop, 111 P.2d 261, 263-S4 (Utah 
1986); State v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992, 994-95 
(Utah 1978). However, although the legisla-
ture specifically stated in the statute that it 
intended section 76-3-203.1 to be an en-
hancement, this is not dispositive as to what 
the legislature actually did. 
[4,5] 18 The gang enhancement statute 
provides in part: 
(1) (a) A person who commits any offense 
listed in Subsection (4) in concert with two 
or more persons is subject to an enhanced 
penalty for the offense as provided below, 
(b) "In concert with two or more per-
sons" as used in this section means the 
defendant and two or more other persons 
. would be criminally liable for the offense as 
parties under Section 76-2-202. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(l)(a) & (b) 
(1995) (emphasis added). Section 76-2-202, 
the requisite mental state for murder. This 
means that the issue of the applicable burden of 
proof is squarely before us today. See infra 1 9. 
4. Lopes raises a senes of other claims. He ar-
gues that the statute interferes with his funda-
mental due process rights because it denies him 
his right to a preliminary hearing, which article 
I, section 13 of the Utah Constitution guarantees. 
In the alternative, he argues that the statute 
identifies additional elements of the underlying 
offense that the State must prove bevond a rea-
sonable doubt to the same tner of fact who 
decided guilt on the predicate crime. And final-
ly, Lopes argues on appeal that the statute vio-
lates the federal Due Process Clause because it is 
vague and overlv broad and that it violates the 
Equai Protection Clause of the United States 
Constitution and the uniform operation of laws 
provision of the Utah Constitution Because we 
decide this case based on the fundamental rights 
arguments in the text, we do not need to address 
these additional constitutional challenges. 
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referred to in section 76-3-2Q3.1(l)(b), states 
that a person who acts 4*with the mental state 
required for the commission of an offense," 
and "either directly commits the offense, [or] 
solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or 
intentionally aids another person to engage 
in conduct which constitutes an offense shall 
be criminally liable as a party for such con-
ducts Id. § 76-2-202. In summary, section 
76-3-203.1 (l)(a) requires that all three actors 
must (i) have possessed a mental state suffi-
cient to commit the same underlying offense 
and (ii) have directly committed the underly-
ing offense or solicited, requested, command-
ed, encouraged, or intentionally aided one of 
the other two actors to engage in conduct 
constituting the underlying offense. At a 
minimum, under the statute, the State must 
prove that all three actors are guilty of "aid-
ing and abetting." This was the effective 
holding of our decisions in State v. Labrum, 
925 P.2d 937 (Utah 1996) ("Labrum F) and 
State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450 (Utah 1994). 
In Labrum J, we made it clear that "in 
concert" under the gang enhancement stat-
ute means that the defendant acted with at 
least two other people and 4Athat those other 
persons must also be liable for the underly-
ing offense." Id at 940; see also California 
v. Zermeno, 61 Cal.App.4th 623, 628, 71 Cal. 
Rptr^d 672 (Cal.CtApp.1998) (holding that 
statute imposing enhanced sentence upon 
showing of "pattern of criminal gang activity" 
required State to show beyond a reasonable 
doubt that at least one other actor was guilty 
of "aiding and abetting" defendant). 
19 This leads us to the burden of proof 
issue. In Labrum I, we did not address the 
burden of proof by which the State must 
prove the "in concert" element of the gang 
enhancement statute, but the court of ap-
peals did address that question in a subse-
quent appeal. In Labrum /, we stated that 
before imposing the gang enhancement, the 
statute required "the sentencing judge [to] 
make discrete . . . findings" that are "indis-
pensable to the gang enhancement statute 
because they establish the legal basis that 
justifies imposition of the prescribed penal-
ty." Labrum /, 925 P.2d at 940. We re-
5. The court of appeals decided Labrum II after 
oral argument in the present xrase. Pursuant to 
rule 24(h) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Proce-
manded Labrum I for further proceedings 
because "no specific finding was entered with 
respect to the complicity of the other two 
persons who accompanied Labrum." Id. at 
941. On remand, the trial court made factual 
findings regarding the other two actors' par-
ticipation and then .enhanced Labrums sen-
tence. See State v. Labrum, 959 P.2d 120, 
121 (Utah CtApp.1998) CLabrum IF). 
Labrum again appealed. 
110 Before the court of appeals, Labrum 
argued that the sentencing court's findings 
were legally insufficient to fix accomplice lia-
bility. Labrum premised his argument on 
both the language of the statute and due 
process. The court of appeals reversed the 
enhancement on grounds that the findings 
were insufficient It did not address the 
constitutional question; instead, it held: 
Under this statute, it is not enough that 
others were present when the crime was 
committed. Rather, the quality of their 
involvement must rise to the level of par-
ticipation described in section 76-2-202, 
Id. at 124. The court of appeals then went 
on to say mat all three actors umust possess 
a sufficiently culpable mental state, and the 
prosecution must prove the foregoing beyond 
a reasonable doubt" Id. (emphasis added). 
Because the court of appeals appeared to 
rely on statutory interpretation to fix the 
burden of proof, it had no occasion to address 
Labium's constitutional challenges.5 
[6] U 11 Today, Lopes presents to this 
court a challenge to the gang enhancement 
statute that is essentially identical to the one 
passed upon by the court of appeals in Lab-
rum II. He contends that the State must 
prove all the elements of accomplice liability, 
including the mental state, beyond a reason-
able doubt We agree with Lopes and con-
clude that the statutory "enhancement" re-
quires proof of the other actor's criminal 
culpability, and that the State must prove 
their criminal culpability beyond a reason-
able doubt This conclusion finds support in 
dure, Lopes notified this court of the Labrum II 
decision. 
STATE v, 
Cite M 980 PJd 
our decision in State v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992 
(Utah 1978). 
, 112 In Angus, the defendant was charged 
with aggravated assault, • and the State 
sought a firearm enhancement The defen-
dant argued that the. firearm enhancement 
statute created a separate offense that the 
State had to plead as a separate crime, not as 
an enhancement This court disagreed See 
id. at 994. In rejecting the claim of a sepa-
rate crime that had to be separately charged, 
we said: "When the matter is looked at 
correctly and realistically, it is seen that 
there is but one criminal act charged, but 
describing it accurately brings it within the 
higher penalty prescribed by law: to-wit, an 
aggravated assault which was committed 
with a firearm." Id. at 994 (footnote omit-
ted). Angus acknowledged that the legisla-
ture has the prerogative "to prescribe the 
punishment for crimes" and thereby may 
"increase the degree of crime." Id We said 
that the legislature, by enacting the firearm 
enhancement, had increased the degree of 
the crime by establishing a separate set of 
elements that, if proven, warranted a higher 
punishment Importantly for present pur-
poses, we concluded in Angus that while the 
State did not need to separately charge the 
enhancement as a crime, it did need to prove 
each element, including the defendant's use 
of a firearm, beyond a reasonable doubt be-
cause the crime was increased as to degree 
by the presence of the firearm. See id. at 
995. 
U 13 Returning to the present case, as both 
a state and federal constitutional matter, we 
conclude that due process requires that the 
prosecution prove every element of the 
charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. 
See Utah Const a r t I, § 7; U.S. Const, 
amend. V, XIV; see also State v. Herrera, 
895 P.2d 359, 368 (Utah 1995) ("due process 
mandates that the prosecution prove every 
element of the charged crimes beyond a rea-
sonable doubt."); State v. Swenson, 838 P.2d 
1136, 1138 (Utah 1992) (holding that State 
has burden of proving all elements of a 
crime); State v. Starks, 627 P.2d 88, 92 (Utah 
1981) ("A fundamental precept of our crimi-
nal law is that the state must prove all 
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elements of a crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt"). 
114 Furthermore, and independently, as a 
statutory matter, the Code requires that the 
State prove each element of the charged 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (1995) (requiring that 
each "element of the offense' charged" be 
"proved beyond a reasonable doubt," includ-
ing "[t]he conduct, attendant circumstances, 
and [t]he culpable mental state required."). 
115 When the legislature passed the gang 
enhancement provision, it acted just as it did 
when it passed the firearm enhancement pro-
vision: it mandated imposition of an enhance-
ment only upon proof of elements over and 
above those required for the crime of lesser 
consequence. In essence, it created a specif-
ic new crime or a crime of a higher degree. 
As such, each of the elements must be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, 
they were not. Therefore, we find the trial 
courts imposition of the gang enhancement to 
have been in error. 
[7] 1116 Finally, we turn to Lopes's as-
sertion that the gang enhancement statute 
interferes with his right to a jury trial. He 
argues that since the statute creates a sepa-
rate and new offense, each element must be 
found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury, 
not the trial judge. We agree. The Utah 
Constitution provides "[i]n aiminal prosecu-
tions the accused shall have the right . . . to 
have a speedy public trial by an impartial 
jury." Utah Const art I, § 12. In criminal 
jury trials, questions of fact and the weight 
of evidence are to be decided by the jury, 
absent waiver. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-
17-10 (1995); State v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 
589-90, 6 P.2d 177, 181 (1931) ("It is the sole 
and exclusive province of the jury to deter-
mine the facts in all criminal cases, whether 
the evidence offered by the state is weak or 
strong, is in conflict or is not controverted."). 
1117 The gang enhancement statute, sec-
tion 76-3-203.1(5)(c), provides: 
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the 
jury shall decide whether to impose the 
enhanced penalty under this section. The 
imposition of the penalty is contingent 
upon a finding by the sentencing judge 
that this section is applicable. In conjunc-
tion with sentencing the court shall enter 
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written findings of fact concerning the ap-
plicability of this section. 
This section of the enhancement statute di-
rects the judge to become the fact finder, 
expressly taking that power away from the 
jury. In this case, the judge followed the 
statute and became the fact finder. Even 
though Lopes pled guilty to the underlying 
offense, his plea did not establish the requi-
site mental state of the other actors, as is 
necessary to support imposition of the gang 
enhancement. His plea, then, did not estab-
lish all of the elements of the enhancement 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt The trial 
judge supplemented the plea by making the 
factual finding that the elements of the gang 
enhancement were established, and imple-
mented the enhancement. This clearly vio-
lated article I, section 12 of the Utah Consti-
tution because, absent waiver, only a jury has 
the ability to determine when elements of a 
crime are established beyond a reasonable 
doubt Therefore, we find subsection (5)(c) 
of § 76-3-203.1 of the Code unconstitutional. 
[8,9] 1 18 Having held subsection (5)(c) 
unconstitutional, we now determine if the 
remainder of the gang enhancement statute 
can remain in effect. The general rule is 
"that statutes, where possible, are to be con-
strued so as to sustain their constitutionality. 
Accordingly, if a portion of the statute might 
be saved by severing the part that is uncon-
stitutional, such should be done." Celebrity 
Club Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'% 
657 P.2d 1293, 1299 (Utah 1982). This basic 
rule applies to criminal and civil statutes 
equally. See State v. Nielsen, 19 Utah 2d 66, 
69, 426 P.2d 13, 15 (1967) (court severed 
unconstitutional section of criminal statute); 
State v. Green, 793 P.2d 912, 917 (Utah Ct 
App.1990) (holding that basic rule [of sever-
6. Section 76-1-108 states: "If any provision of 
this act, or the application of any provision to 
any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the 
remainder of this act shall not be affected there-
by." Although we have never interpreted this 
provision in the past, we now find that the only 
purpose of this section is to preserve the entire 
criminal code m case any one provision is de-
clared unconstitutional. On its face, it does not 
give any direction in this circumstance, where 
we are trving to determine the severability of one 
subsection from a larger section. 
ing unconstitutional provision] applies to the 
construction of criminal statutes). 
[10-12] U 19 To determine if a statute is 
severable from its unconstitutional subsec-
tion, we look to legislative intent. If the 
intent is not expressly stated, we then turn 
to the statute itself, and examine the remain-
ing constitutional portion of the statute in 
relation to the stricken portion. If the re-
mainder of the statute is operable and still 
furthers the intended legislative purpose, the 
statute will be allowed to stand. See Union 
Trust Co. v. Simrrums, 116 Utah 422, 429, 
211 P.2d 190,193 (1949), quoted in Stewart v. 
Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 885 P2d 759, 779-
80 (Utah 1994). 
[13] 120 The criminal code contains a 
separability clause, but it does not aid us in 
this situation.6 Furthermore, since there is 
no express intent on the severability question 
in the gang enhancement statute, we exam-
ine the statute itself to determine if severing 
section 76-3-203.1 (5)(c) will destroy the pur-
pose of the statute. A close reading of 76-3-
203.1 indicates that severing subsection (5)(c) 
will not make the objective of the statute 
unconstitutional.7 The statute imposes high-
er penalties if a person commits certain of-
fenses "in concert with two or more persons." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(1 )(1995). It 
makes no difference in the application of the 
statute or the satisfaction of its purposes if 
the trial judge is the fact finder or if the 
questions of fact are left to the jury. We 
therefore find the remaining portion of the 
gang enhancement statute constitutional. 
U 21 We address the proper course of fur-
ther proceedings in this case. We reverse 
and remand for a new trial on the gang 
enhancement charge. Our remand does not 
7. Section 76-3-203.2 of the Utah Code* which 
imposes enhanced penalties for the use of dan-
gerous weapons in offenses committed on school 
premises, is almost identical in structure to- the 
gang enhancement statute. A key difference is 
that section 76-3-203.2 does not include a sec-
tion making the judge the fact finder in a particu-
lar case. It seems clear that holding subsection 
(5Xc) of the gang enhancement statute invalid as 
unconstitutional will not frustrate the legislative 
purpose of the statute, as section 76-3-203.2 




place the defendant in double jeopardy, be-
•cause the failure to prove an essential- ele-
ment of the gang enhancement charge was 
atrial error." See State v. Higginbotham, 
917 P.2d 545, 550-51 (Utah 1996) (decision 
was reversed and remanded due to failure to 
^Srove an essential element of the charge). It 
was not the fault of the "prosecution that all 
"elements of the gang enhancement statute 
were not satisfied. Until this decision, no 
'one had notice that the enhancement statute 
requires proof of all elements beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, or that this determination 
"could not be made by a judge absent a 
traiver of the right to a jury trial. There-
fore, the State should not be denied the right 
to a fair adjudication because of double jeop-
ardy. See State v. Lamorie, 610 P.2d 342, 
347 (Utah 1980) ('The state and the accused 
share the right to a fair, error-free determi-
nation of the guilt or innocence of the ac-
cused, and the double jeopardy clause may 
not deny either side that right"). 
U22 We hold that the gang enhancement 
statute creates a new and separate offense 
and, therefore, the Code requires each ele-
ment of this crime be proved beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. Since the elements of the 
crime were not established against Lopes, 
either by his plea or by a jury trial, he was 
deprived of his due process rights as guaran-
teed by the federal and Utah constitutions. 
Furthermore, subsection (5)(c) of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-203.1 is found to violate a defen-
dants right to a jury trial as established in 
the Constitution of the State of Utah. We 
reverse and remand for a new trial on the 
section 76-3-203.1 charge. 
123 Associate Chief Justice DURHAM 
and Justice STEWART concur in Justice 
ZIMMERMAN'S opinion. 
RUSSON, Justice, dissenting: 
U24 I dissent In my opinion, the gang 
enhancement statute is simply a sentencing 
statute. It does not create a separate of-
fense with a separate penalty, nor does it add 
elements to the underlying offense. Rather, 
it merely enhances the minimum sentence for 
the underlying offense once the accused has 
been found guilty of that offense; the maxi-
mum sentence remains the same regardless 
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of whether the enhancement applies. In 
fact, the statute specifically states, "This sec-
tion does not create any separate offense but 
provides an enhanced penalty for the pri-
mary offense." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
203.1(5)(a) (1995)'. 
125 As a general principle, the legislature 
has,broad authority to define crimes and 
corresponding punishments, and its decision 
in this regard should not be proscribed un-
less it offends some fundamental principle of 
justice. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 
U.S.79, 85-86, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed^d 67 
(1986); see also State v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992, 
994-95 (Utah 1978) ("It is the prerogative of 
the legislature to prescribe the punishment 
for crimes."). With respect to Utah's fire-
arm and gang enhancement statutes, this 
court has recognized and upheld the legisla-
ture's authority to require a trial judge to 
enhance a defendant's statutory minimum 
sentence if certain requirements are met 
during the sentencing phase. See, e.g.. State 
v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 461 (Utah 1994) 
(affirming trial court's imposition of en-
hanced minimum sentence under section 76-
3-203.1 upon court's finding that defendant 
committed underlying offense "in concert" 
with others); State v. Deli 861 P.2d 431, 
434-35 (Utah 1993) (affirming trial court's 
imposition of enhanced minimum sentence 
under section 76-3-203 for use of firearm 
during commission of offense); An^ws,-. 581 
P.2d at 995 (same). 
126 Notably, with respect to the firearm 
enhancement statute, we have consistently 
held that the statute does not create a sepa-
rate, additional penalty for the underlying 
offense; it merely "enhances" the minimum 
sentence. For example, in Angus, after the 
defendant had been convicted of aggravated 
assault, the trial court imposed an enhanced 
minimum sentence pursuant to the firearm 
enhancement statute. See 581 P.2d at 993. 
Rejecting the defendant's argument that the 
statute created a separate offense which 
must be charged separately, we stated: 
The pumshment for a crime is not and 
has never been considered a part of the 
pleading charging a crime — After con-
viction, the penalty to be imposed is an 
entirely separate proposition to be deter-
mined bv the court as a matter of law on 
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the basis of the penalty prescribed by the 
statutes. 
Angus, 581 P.2d at 995. 
1 27 More recently, in Deli we affirmed a 
firearm enhancement imposed after the de-
fendant was convicted of a number of crimes, 
including murder. Once again, we empha-
sized that the enhancement penalties of the 
firearm enhancement statute are not sepa-
rate sentences; instead, "the legislature in-
tended the penalty for using a firearm in the 
commission of a felony to simply increase' or 
'enhance' the original sentence imposed, not 
to stand alone as a separate sentence." Deli, 
861 P.2d at 434. 
128 In Alvarez, we upheld an enhanced 
penalty imposed pursuant to the gang en-
hancement statute, see 872 P.2d at 461-62; 
however, in that case we did not address 
whether section 76-3-203.1 creates a sepa-
rate offense with a separate penalty. I 
would hold that it does not Before a defen-
dant is subject to an enhanced penalty under 
either the firearm or the gang enhancement 
statute, the defendant first must be convicted 
of an underlying offense.1 Thereafter, the 
sentencing judge must impose an "indetermi-
nate" sentence prescribed by statute.2 While 
the judge ordinarily has the power to sus-
pend the defendant's sentence,3 under the 
firearm and gang enhancement statutes the 
judge must enhance the minimum sentence 
for the underlying offense if certain require-
ments are met Thus, the gang enhance-
ment statute operates in exactly the same 
1. The underlying offenses are enumerated in 
Utah Code Ann § 76-3-203.1(4) and include 
crimes such as murder, rape, kidnapping, and 
robbery. 
2. Under Utah's indeterminate sentencing 
scheme, the sentencing judge must impose a 
sentence and judgment of imprisonment for an 
indeterminate term "of not less than the mini-
mum and not to exceed the maximum term pro-
vided by law for the particular crime." Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-4(2). Unless otherwise ex-
pressly provided by law, every sentence "shall 
continue until the maximum period has been 
reached unless sooner terminated or commuted 
by authority of the Board of Pardons and Pa-
role." Id.'% 77-18-4(3); see also Padilla v 
Board of Pardons, 947 P.2d 664, 669 (Utah 1997) 
("By its very term, the 'indeterminate' sentence 
shall continue until the maximum penod expires 
manner as the firearm enhancement stat-
ute—that is, it merely increases the mini-
mum sentence which the legislature has pre-
scribed for the underlying offense. It does 
not affect the maximum sentence. 
129 The majority opinion holds that the 
"in concert" requirement defined in section 
76-3-203.1 creates a separate offense be-
cause it combines a separate mens rea—i.e., 
"in concert" mental culpability—with a crimi-
nal act This reasoning is flawed. While a 
defendant may be charged with a crime and 
held accountable as an accomplice under sec-
tion 76-2-202,4 the mere fact that a statute 
may operate to impose criminal liability does 
not preclude its use as a sentencing factor, so 
long as its use in sentencing does not carry a 
separate or additional penalty. Like the fire-
arm enhancement statute, the gang enhance-
ment statute does not impose an additional 
or separate penalty upon the judge's finding 
that the defendant would be criminally liable 
under that statute; it simply enhances the 
minimum sentence. 
1130 The mere fact that the statute re-
quires the judge to make a certain finding 
before imposing a sentence does not make 
that finding an additional element of the 
predicate offense. For instance, in connec-
tion with sentencing, a judge is called upon to 
weigh aggravating and mitig-ating factors, 
and those factors do not thereby become 
additional elements of the underlying of-
fense: 
unless the Board, in its discretion, terminates or 
commutes the punishment or pardons the offend-
er".). Under section 77-27-9(1 )(b) (Supp 1998), 
the Board of Pardons and Parole may release an 
offender before the minimum term has been 
served if mitigating circumstances justify the re-
lease. 
3. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp.1998). 
4.- See State v. Cornish, 560 P.2d 1134, 1136 (Utah 
1977) (explaining that accomplice is one who 
participates in enme in such a way that he could 
be charged with same offense as the principal 
defendant); State v. Murphy, 26 Utah 2d 330, 489 
P.2d 430. 431 (1971) (concluding that defendant 
who drove co-defendant to store that was 
robbed, waited in car with engine running, and 
then drove co-defendant to another car one block 
away after co-defendant had allegedly killed 
store owner was "principal"). 
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In all cases where an indeterminate1 sen-
tence is imposed, the judge imposing the 
sentence may . .- mail to the [Board of 
Pardons and Parolel . . . any information 
he may have regarding the character of 
the offender or any mitigating or aggrava-
ting circumstances connected with the of-
fense for which the offender has been con-
-victed. 
•Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-13(5)(a) (Supp. 
1998); see also id § 7&-3-201(6)(a) (Supp. 
1998) ("If a statute under which the defen-
dant was convicted mandates that one of 
three stated minimum terms shall be im-
posed, the court shall order imposition of the 
term of middle severity unless there are 
circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of 
the crime."); id § 7&-3-201 (6)(c) (Supp. 
1998) ("In determining whether there are 
circumstances that justify imposition of the 
highest or lowest term, the court may consid-
er . . . statements in aggravation or mitiga-
tion submitted by the prosecution or the 
defendant, and any further evidence intro-
duced at the sentencing hearing."). 
1 31 Furthermore, in considering the perti-
nent sentencing factors, judges sometimes 
must take into account the defendant's men-
tal state. For example, the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration requires judges to 
"[c]onsider [the following] aggravating cir-
cumstances only if they are not an element of 
the offense— 5. Offense was character-
ized by extreme cruelty or depravity 7. 
Offender's attitude is not conducive to super-
vision in a less restrictive setting." Utah 
Code of Judicial Admin, app. C, at 1297 
(1998); accord id app. D, at 1368 (authoriz-
ing presentence investigator to consider 
whether crime was characterized by extreme 
cruelty or depravity); id at 1371 (same). 
Thus, weighing the defendants state of mind 
is well within the realm of a sentencing 
judge's authority. 
132 Moreover, acting with uin concert" 
mental culpability is not identified as an ele-
ment of any of the enumerated felonies in the 
gang enhancement statute. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-203.1(4). In fact, under the 
statute, a sentencing judge does not even 
inquire into the defendant's mental state un-
til after the defendant has been duly convict-
ed of an enumerated felony. 
133 The United States Supreme Court's 
decision in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 
U.S. 79, 91, 106 S.Ct 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 
(1986), is instructive. That case involved a 
constitutional challenge to a Pennsylvania 
sentencing statute which provides that any-
one convicted of certain enumerated felonies 
is subject to a mandatory minimum sentence 
of five years' imprisonment if the sentencing 
judge finds, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that the defendant "visibly possessed 
a firearm" during the commission of the of-
fense. McMillan, ATI U.S. at 81, 106 S.Ct. 
2411. Recognizing that states have broad 
authority to define crimes and prescribe pen-
alties, the Court observed that 
the Pennsylvania Legislature has express-
ly provided that visible possession of a 
firearm is not an element of the crimes 
enumerated in the mandatory sentencing 
statute . . . but instead is a sentencing 
factor that comes into play only after the 
defendant has been found guilty of one of 
those crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Id at 85-86,106 S.Ct 2411. 
134 In upholding the constitutionality of 
the Pennsylvania statute, the McMillan 
Court reasoned that (1) the enhancement 
implied no presumption of guilt, nor was the 
prosecution relieved of its burden of proving 
the defendant guilty of an enumerated of-
fense, see id at 87, 106 S.Ct. 2411; (2) the 
enhancement did not extend the period of 
incarceration beyond the terms provided for 
any of the enumerated felonies to which it 
applied, nor did it create a separate offense 
calling for a separate penalty, but rather 
merely limited the trial court's sentencing 
discretion in selecting a penalty within the 
range already available to it, see id at 87-88, 
106 S.Ct 2411; (3) "[t]he statute [gave] no 
impression of having been tailored to permit 
the visible possession finding to be a tail 
which wags the dog of the substantive of-
fense," i.e., the argument that the enhance-
ment was really an element of the offense 
lacked even superficial appeal because it did 
not expose the defendant to greater or addi-
tional punishment, see id at 88, 106 S.Ct. 
2411; and (4) the Pennsylvania legislature 
"did not change the definition of any existing 
offense [but] simply took one factor that has 
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always been considered by sentencing courts 
to bear on punishment—the instrumentality 
used in committing a violent felony—and dic-
tated the precise weight to be given that 
factor." Id. at 89-90,106 S.Ct 2411. 
In conclusion, the Court stated: 
Sentencing courts have traditionally heard 
evidence and found facts without any pre-
scribed burden of proof at all. 
Sentencing courts necessarily consider 
the circumstances of an offense in selecting 
the appropriate punishment, and we have 
consistently approved sentencing schemes 
that mandate consideration of facts related 
to the crime without suggesting that those 
facts must be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt 
Id at 91-92, 106 S.Ct. 2411 (citations omit-
ted). 
H35 Under McMillan's reasoning, the 
gang enhancement statute at hand is clearly 
constitutional. First, the Utah Legislature 
expressly chose to make group criminal ac-
tivity a sentencing factor rather than a sepa-
rate offense. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
203.1(5)(a) ("This section does not create any 
separate offense but provides an enhanced 
penalty for the primary offense/'). This is 
clear not only from the language of the stat-
ute, but also because the statute does not 
impose an additional, separate penalty to the 
penalty for the underlying offense. Second, 
the statute comes into play only after the 
defendant has been duly convicted of violat-
ing one of the enumerated offenses in section 
76-3-203.1(4). The statute implies no pre-
sumption of guilt, and the prosecution is not 
relieved of its burden of proving each ele-
ment of an enumerated felony. Third, the 
statute does not expose the defendant to a 
greater maximum term; it merely increases 
the minimum sentence prescribed by statute 
for the underlying offense. Thus, the statute 
in no way operates as "a tail which wags the 
dog of the substantive offense." McMMan, 
5. While Lopes does not question the reasoning 
upholding the Pennsylvania statute in McMillan, 
he asks this court to invalidate the gang en-
hancement statute, which actually makes it more 
difficult for a judge to enhance a defendant's sen-
tence. Under the Pennsylvania statute, the sen-
tencing judge was merely required to make a 
477 U.S. at 88, 106 S.Ct. 2411. Fourth, even 
if the commission of an offense <4in concert 
with two or more persons" has not tradition-
ally been a sentencing factor1, that fact alone 
should not limit the legislature's authority to 
prescribe an enhanced penalty for such con-
duct If the legislature has the authority to 
determine that committing a crime while visi-
bly possessing a firearm is a factor that 
should be given precise weight during sen-
tencing, it should also have the authority to 
determine that committing a crime "in con-
cert with two or more persons" justifies im-
position of an enhanced minimum sentence if 
certain requirements are met.5 
136 Finally, I disagree with the majority's 
description of the claimed constitutional right 
allegedly impinged upon by the gang en-
hancement statute. The majority contends 
that because the statute enhances the mini-
mum sentence on the basis of findings con-
cerning the defendant's mental culpability, 
those findings somehow become additional 
elements of a separate crime. As already 
indicated, I disagree with this premise. 
More disturbing, however, is that from this, 
the majority extrapolates that under both the 
state and the federal due process clauses, the 
statute violates a criminal defendant's funda-
mental right to be presumed innocent until 
each element of the offense is proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt. While criminal defen-
dants certainly have a right to such a pre-
sumption of innocence, the majority identifies 
no authority that this right is infringed when 
a sentencing judge makes findings relevant 
to sentencing without the state having to 
prove those findings beyond a reasonable 
doubt Without any articulated constitution-
al basis, the majority simply states that this 
is required. 
1137 In sum, because the gang enhance-
ment statute creates neither a separate 
crime with a separate penality nor an addi-
tional element to an underlying offense, I 
factual finding that the defendant visibly pos-
sessed a firearm. Under the gang enhancement 
statute, the sentencing judge must make a factual 
finding and must further determine that the de-
fendant possessed the mental state required for 
liability as an accomplice to the underlying of-
fense. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202. 
STATE v.£ALL 
Cite at 980 ?2d 201 (Utah 1999) 
Utah 201 
would hold that Lopes was not denied any 
fundamental rights. I would affirm. 
138 Chief Justice HOWE concurs in Jus-
tice RUSSON*S dissenting opinion. Lk 
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The District Court, Salt Lake Division, 
Frank G. Noel, J., revoked probationer's pro-
bation for violation occurring after probation 
had been extended. Probationer appealed. 
The Court of Appeals certified case. The 
Supreme Court, Howe, CJ., held that (1) 
probation was properly extended by proba-
tioner's agreement to one-year extension and 
waiver of personal appearance well before 
expiration date, and (2) waiver was knowing-
ly, voluntarily and intelligently made. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law <3»982.7 
To extend probationary period beyond 
its original term, State must take definitive 
action to extend term before the expiration 
date, and probationer must be given notice of 
that intent U.C.A.1953, 77-18-l(12)(a)(i). 
2. Criminal Law @=>982.7 
Probation was properly extended by 
probationer's agreement to one-year exten-
sion and waiver of personal appearance on 
extension well before expiration date, even 
though State did not initiate extension pro-
l. The parties disagree on the date when Call's 
probation began. Call asserts that it began on 
April 3, 1992. the dav the court orally sentenced 
him. The State, however, relies on State v. 
ceedings prior to that date, as probationer 
had actual notice that his term of probation 
would not expire at conclusion of statutory 
36-month period. U.CJL1953, . 77-18-
l(12)(a)(i). 
3. Criminal Law <S=»982.7 
Probationer knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waived his right to hearing on 
issue of whether his probation, should be 
extended by signing waiver form that in-
formed him of his right to appear and to be 
represented by counsel, as. defendant was 
competent read from, able to read form, and 
had reasonable understanding of proceed-
ings. U.C JU953,77-lS-l(12)(a)(i). 
Jan Graham, Att'y Gen., Barnard N. Mad-
sen, Asst Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff. 
Joan C. Watt, Scott C. Williams, Salt Lake 
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HOWE, Chief Justice: 
H1 Defendant Leslie J. Call appealed to 
the Utah Court of Appeals from a district 
court order revoking his probation and or-
dering him to serve his sentence of two con-
current prison terms. However, after oral 
argument but before rendering a decision, 
the court of appeals certified it to us pursu-
ant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(3) and rule 
43 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
BACKGROUND 
12 On November 15, 1991, Call pleaded 
guilty to one count of burglary and one count 
of attempted forcible sexual abuse, both third 
degree felonies. The trial court sentenced 
him to serve two concurrent terms of zero to 
five years in prison but then suspended his 
sentence and placed him on probation for a 
period of three years. Although the court 
orally sentenced Call on April 3, 1992, it did 
not enter the written judgment and sentence 
until April 8,1992.1 
Anderson. 797 P.2d 1114 (Utah Ct.App 1990), to 
argue that Call's probationary period did not 
begin until April 8, 1992, the dav the court 
signed and entered the written judgment. 
